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Abstract: Over the last decade, advocates of the interdisciplinary concept of social capital have celebrated the fact that elements 
of local social structures--embodied in social norms, networks and organizations--can significantly affect well-being in fishing 
communities.  But does this concept bring anything to the study and practice of fisheries management that is not already known?  
This paper argues that value is added to the formation of fisheries policy by viewing elements of local social structures as a form 
of capital.  When norms, networks and organizations are analyzed, in a microeconomic context, as potentially productive assets, 
they can properly be valued alongside physical, human, and natural capital.  The paper details how doing so can promise to 
further increase the probability of sustainable use of many (but not all) local fisheries through specific investments in social 
capital. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Gloucester, Massachusetts, the social capital among 
fishers and their families is in decline: social organizations 
and norms among fishers have deteriorated over the last 
decade as fish stocks have declined and fishing regulations 
have increased.  Since 1991, membership in the Sons of 
Italy and Societa Siciliana, comprised of fishers and their 
families, has declined by at least 60 percent (Griffith and 
Dyer 1996)--even while membership in the less specialized 
Moose and Elks associations have remained stable.
1  A  
leader of a local fishing association notes how these changes 
have affected their livelihoods:  
 
“People don't talk to each other anymore 
on the water. Everyone is so frustrated 
and afraid. Nobody is helping anybody 
out on the water anymore. This is 
because of the days at sea program. If I 
have to come in, and you go out on your 
block, then if you know where I was 
fishing, you'll get my fish. So everyone is 
keeping to themselves.” 
 
And since information sharing about concentrations of fish 
has deteriorated, there has been an increase of “brokers”, 
fishing trips in which little or no fish are caught (Griffith 
and Dyer 1996).  
 
                                                             
1 From 1991 to 1996, membership in the Sons of Italy 
declined from 304 to 89; from 1991 to 1995, membership 
in the Societa Siciliana declined from 200 to 79. 
This paper presents a theoretical framework for showing 
how the concept of social capital, when embedded in an 
appropriate micro-economic context, can add value to the 
formation of fisheries policy in communities like 
Gloucester.  When elements of local social structures--
including social organizations like the Sons of Italy and 
Societa Siciliana--are analyzed as productive forms of 
capital that can be augmented by specific investments, they 
can properly be valued aside physical, human, and natural 
capital.   
 
The focus of this paper is on fishing communities, defined 
as a set of households that have traditionally depended on a 
communal fishing resource for a large share of their 
livelihood.
2  The paper concentrates on local fisheries with 
the potential for co-management, defined as collaborative 
management among a range of stakeholders, including the 
fishers themselves, officials in the public sector, and other 
outsiders with an interest in promoting the sustainable use 
of communal fishing resources (for example, local or 
national NGOs).
  
 
In such fishing communities, what are the possible 
investments by this range of stakeholders?  Physical capital 
investments might include expenditures on new fishing 
technologies and new public infrastructure to upgrade local 
ports.  Human capital investments might include 
                                                             
2  Note that social capital can play a role in much larger 
realms of fisheries management -- for example, the 
formation of international agreements to regulate open 
access fisheries.  The papers in Keohane and Ostrom 
(1995) show how many of the lessons for governing local 
commons can be transferred to the international arena. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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expenditures for training captains and their crews in new, 
sustainable fishing techniques.  Social capital investments 
might include expenditures on stakeholder conferences; the 
training of community leaders, and support for fishing 
organizations. 
 
This paper argues that stakeholders in fisheries management 
who are weighing the expected returns on possible capital 
expenditures should consider all three kinds of investments-
-even as they imply that such practitioners should not 
always be advocating investments in social capital. 
 
The rest of this is paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 
presents an analytical perspective on what social capital is 
and how it may generally affect economic outcomes.   
Section 3 presents a theoretical framework on how social 
capital can critically affect the use of fisheries.  Section 4 
builds on the framework to present a set of policy options 
for investing in social capital.  Section 5 summarizes the 
main policy conclusions. 
 
2.  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND WELL-BEING 
 
Over the last decade, many advocates of the 
interdisciplinary concept of social capital have documented 
how elements of local social structures--embodied in social 
norms, networks and organizations--can significantly affect 
the use of fishing resources.  For example, Ostrom 
introduces  Governing the Commons, her masterful study on 
the evolution of institutions for collective action, with the 
example of overfishing in Georges Bank.  She then begins 
to detail the role of  local institutions in the governing of 
local commons with the example of the inshore fishery at 
Alanya (Ostrom 1990). 
 
But this fact--that elements of local social structures can 
affect the use of many local fisheries--comes as no surprise 
to anyone with a lifetime of experience in fisheries 
management.  After all, local fisheries are classic common 
pool resources.  Experts in this field have long since 
established that one of the most effective constraints to 
overusing fisheries are active fishing organizations and 
norms of reciprocity among local fishers.  
 
What, then, does the concept of social capital bring to the 
study and practice of fisheries management that is not 
already known? Paraphrasing from the conference theme, 
does it offer insights and perspective that enrich our 
understanding of human behavior and its effect on fisheries?  
 
The premise of the concept of social capital begins with the 
observation that recurring and patterned social interactions 
within a well-defined boundary form a local ‘social 
structure’
3, and that the characteristics of this social 
structure will affect many economic decisions of agents 
within that boundary.  Specifically, the local social structure 
may affect economic decisions and outcomes through three 
main mechanisms: information sharing; the impact on 
transaction costs, and the reduction of collective action 
dilemmas. 
  
First, social structures can affect information sharing among 
agents.  When agents interact frequently in local 
organizations and networks and in the observance of local 
norms, they are more likely to observe each other’s 
behavior (one-way information sharing) and to exchange 
information about their daily lives (two-way information 
sharing).  By contrast, when local organizations, networks 
and norms exclude different groups of agents, they can 
diminish the frequency of one-way and two-way information 
sharing.  
 
Second, social interactions can affect the level of 
transactions costs associated with many market exchanges.  
When agents frequently and regularly interact in social 
settings, they establish patterns of expected behavior and 
build bonds of trust.  Combined with the possibility of social 
sanctions, this lowers the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior by agents that are in the same social structure.  By 
contrast, the lack of cooperative norms within social 
structures can lead to lead higher transaction costs and more 
inefficient markets.   
 
Third, without selective constraints, agents in many settings 
will not have an incentive to participate in mutually-
beneficial collective action (Olson 1965).  Frequent and 
regular interactions in social settings lead to the 
development of institutions that can serve as such 
constraints, thereby lowering the incentives of individual 
agents to free ride.  
 
As illustrated by these three mechanisms, elements of social 
structures often serve as constraints on economic decisions. 
  Accordingly, a social structure can be regarded as an 
institution, a “set of constraints which governs the 
behavioral relations among individuals or groups” (Nabli 
and Nugent 1989).  Importantly, this definition 
encompasses both formal institutions such as the rule of law 
and informal institutions such as “cultural rules and codes of 
conduct which … can constrain the relationships between 
different individuals and/or groups” (Nabli and Nugent 
1989).  Following this definition, local social structures 
which affect the optimizing behavior of economic agents 
and can increase (or decrease) overall levels of well-being 
within a community are informal institutions.  
                                                             
3 A social structure can be defined as “recurrent and 
patterned interactions between agents that are maintained 
through sanctions” (Swedberg 1994). IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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This institutional perspective conforms to the definition of 
social capital of Schiff (1992) as “the set of elements of the 
social structure that are arguments or inputs of production 
or utility functions.”
4  As detailed below, this functional 
view can help policy makers in fisheries management to 
assess how specific characteristics of social structures may 
affect the stream of costs and benefits associated with many 
potential policies.  
 
The expected functional relationship between elements of 
the social structure and an economic good--through 
information sharing; the impact on transaction costs, and the 
reduction of collective action dilemmas--critically depends 
on the nature of that good.  Following a standard public 
economics framework, Table 1 in Appendix A illustrates 
the nature of economic goods that may be affected by 
elements of the social structure. 
 
Private goods  Under conditions where households face 
relatively undistorted market prices for the purchase of a 
private good, neither principal-agent problems nor 
collective action dilemmas will have a relatively large 
influence on the optimal consumption and production of 
most private goods. 
 
However, in the production and consumption of private 
goods with large information spillovers, the potential 
influence of social capital through information sharing is 
high.  Much economic and non-economic research suggests 
that the characteristics of social structures are critical 
determinants of the way that information is diffused among 
groups of individuals (Rogers 1995).  For example, Isham 
(2000) finds that among agricultural household in the 
plateau zone of Tanzania, tribally-based social affiliations 
act as a form of social capital in the decision about adopting 
improved fertilizer. Such a positive externality, of course, 
provides an economic justification for investments in the 
delivery of this type of private good. 
 
Toll Goods  By contrast, in the case of toll goods, the 
potential influence of social capital through information 
sharing is relatively low.   
 
                                                             
4 The complete definition of Schiff (1992) is: “Social capital 
is the set of elements of the social structure that affect 
relations among people and are inputs or arguments of the 
production and/or utility function.”  This is one of the class 
of ‘functional’ definitions of social capital consistent with 
the influential formulation of Coleman (1990): “Social 
capital is defined by its function.  It is not a single entity, but 
a variety of different entities having two characteristics in 
common.  They all consist of some aspect of a social 
structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals 
who are within the structure.” 
But because of the non-rival nature of toll goods, the 
potential influence of social capital through transactions 
costs and collective action is high. Where norms of mutual 
trust between stakeholders that use a toll good are low, 
opportunistic behavior--in the form of financial corruption 
or shirking by leaders and public agents --will be more 
prevalent; community norms of reciprocity are often 
necessary for individual households to commit their time 
and resources to provide such a service.   
 
For example, in community-based water systems in the 
developing world, village-level social capital is often 
necessary for individual households to commit their time 
and resources and to subsequently minimize the 
opportunistic behavior of community leaders (Isham and 
Kähkönen 1999). 
 
Collective Goods  In the case of the delivery of selected 
collective goods, the potential influence of social capital 
through transactions costs and collective action will also be 
high, for the reasons specified above: public agents and 
community leaders may divert finances or shirk in the 
absence of trust and selected norms of reciprocity.  Since 
there is no rivalry in the consumption of collective goods (in 
the absence of congestion effects), the free rider problem is 
likely to be more prevalent in the design and the 
maintenance of  a collective good as opposed to its use. 
 
Common Pool Resource  Where projects are promoting the 
delivery of selected common pool resources, the potential 
influence of social capital through transactions costs is also 
high.  As in the case of toll goods and collective goods, 
sustained management of common pool resources often 
depends on the performance of public agents and local 
leaders. 
  
In the case of common pool resources, the potential 
influence of social capital through collective action is even 
higher because of their non-rival and exclusive nature.  The 
presence of active local groups and norms of reciprocity 
will provide a critical incentive for individual households to 
commit their time and resources to start such an activity: 
such elements of the local social structure will also 
minimize overuse of the resources by lowering the free rider 
problem during the use of the good -- that is, the temptation 
of one household to overuse the resource.  (Ostrom 1990). 
 
The information in this table suggests that social capital will 
have the highest possible influence in the delivery of 
common pool resources--precisely those circumstances 
faced by many fishing communities.  
 
 IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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3.  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND FISHING 
COMMUNITIES 
How specifically do local social structures affect economic 
decisions and outcomes in such communities through 
information sharing, the impact on transaction costs, and the 
reduction of collective action dilemmas? 
 
First, social structures do affect information sharing in 
fishing communities: for example (as introduced above), 
when fishers and their families in Gloucester regularly 
attend the meetings of the Sons of Italy or social traditions 
like the annual Blessing of the Fleet, they are more likely to 
regularly exchange information.  By contrast, when local 
organizations are differentiated by gear type (Griffith and 
Dyer 1996)), they can diminish the frequency of one-way 
and two-way information sharing.  
 
Second, in the co-management of community fisheries, 
social interactions among fishers and government agents do 
establish patterns of expected behavior and build bonds of 
trust  that lowers the likelihood of opportunistic behavior.  
Hall-Arber and Finlayson (1997) detail a range of studies of 
fishing communities in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia 
which show that local fishers react to national groundfish 
policies according to local economic and social norms and 
histories. In supporting the potential for co-management of 
fishing communities in Canada and the United States, they 
conclude that “in general, federal fisheries policies work 
best when fishers believe they have been fully consulted in 
the development of fishery rules and that they have a say in 
the implementation of those rules. If local authorities have 
the endorsement of local interests, they believe they can 
enforce the rules”  (Hall-Arber and Finlayson 1997) 
 
Third, community norms of reciprocity can lower dilemmas 
of collective action--for example, by affecting the likelihood 
that fishers will harvest only catch above a certain mandated 
size.  Phil Coates, director of the Massachusetts Division of 
Marine Fisheries, notes that the lobster fishery, with 
informal territorial rights, is strong in self-regulation and 
self-enforcement: "Lobstermen fish close together, they're 
on the water together, they tie up at the same dock. They can 
look over and see what the other guy is doing. So there is 
peer pressure, and there's a high level of compliance” 
(Corey 1997).  By contrast, for selected groundfish with 
more unlimited access, compliance to local regulations is 
often not the rule.  
 
To begin to model the importance of elements of the social 
structure for economic outcomes in fishing communities 
(and to guide the subsequent development of the arguments 
in this paper), equation 1 presents a functional relationship
5 
                                                             
5 Building on the standard production and yield functions for 
fisheries management in Conrad and Clark (1987).  Note, as 
to illustrate the net productive benefits for a fishing 
communities in period t:  
 
(1) Ut= U(Yt, Xt), 
 
where Ut is the flow of net social benefits, Yt is the harvest, 
and Xt is the fish population.  As noted by Conrad and Clark 
(1987), Yt may appear as an argument for purely 
commercial reasons, while Xt may appear as an argument to 
reflect the preservation value for the stock.
6 
 
For a representative fisher in the fishing community, let the 
harvest from fishing include a sub-function Q(.) which has 
as arguments a set of vectors of available productive inputs 
in that time period (Kt, Lt, Ht, and St): 
 
(2)  Et’<t Yt= At*Q(Kt, Lt, Ht, St)*Xt 
 
where Kt is physical capital, Lt is labor, Ht is human capital, 
St is social capital, At is a (factor neutral) productivity 
shifter
7, and Et’<t denotes that this is the expected 
productive relationship in a previous year t￿.  The sub-
function Q(.) is similar to ‘effort’ in the classic fisheries 
management production function; it illustrates how a range 
of inputs can affect each fisher’s production, controlling for 
productivity shocks and the size of the resource base.   
 
This equation (based on the definition of Schiff (1992) and 
the perspective on social capital presented above) allows 
one to consider alternative possibilities for the expected 
productive role of different elements of a local social 
structure alongside more standard productive inputs.  Four 
alternative possibilities are considered below for the 
expected harvest from fishing. 
  
First, if the expected direct productivity of at least one 
element of the social structure (Sit) is positive: 
  
(3)  Et’<t (￿Qt/￿Sit) > 0 
                                                                                                   
detailed below, that this straightforward method for 
modeling the benefits associated with fishing assumes that 
the net social benefits are always increasing in Yt.  Under 
conditions where society has allocated-- say through an   
ITQ program--a share of the fishery to a given agent, a 
different model would be required to show the influence of 
social capital on the costs and benefits of overfishing by 
individual agents.  See Charles et. al. (1999) for an example 
of a model that can be so adapted. 
6 For example, weir fishers and their neighbors on Cape 
Cod value the continued existence of this way of life, apart 
from its commercial value (Arnold 2000). 
7 Depending on the nature of the good, At may be associated 
with, for example, exogenous weather shocks or other 
community-level characteristics.  IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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then there may exist some justification for investments in 
that element of the social structure as a form of social 
capital.  For example, if experience in a community 
suggests that the presence of active fishing associations will 
be associated more cooperation among local fishers, then 
this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a possible 
investment these associations. 
 
Second, if the expected direct productivity of all j elements 
of the local social structure is nil:  
 
(4)  Et’<t (￿Qt/￿Sit) = 0,    
  i = 1 … j 
 
then there still may exist some justification for investments 
in some element of the social structure as a form of social 
capital, as long as one of the following conditions hold: 
 
(5)  Et’<t(￿Kt/￿Sit) > 0;  
Et’<t (￿Lt/￿Sit) > 0; or  
Et’<t (￿Ht/￿Sit) > 0, 
i = 1 … j. 
 
In other words, if some element of the local social structure 
has a productive role in the creation of physical capital, 
labor, or human capital which in turn affects the desired 
output (so that, for example, Et’<t (￿Qt/￿Kt)*(￿Kt/￿Sit) > 0), 
then there still may exist some justification for investments 
in that element of the social structure.  For example, if 
participation among fishing crews in local organizations is 
associated with better information diffusion--including 
information about more sustainable fishing techniques--then 
a possible investment in such a groups may be justified. 
 
Finally, there is also a real possibility, in many cases, that 
some elements of the social structure have a negative effect
8 
on the expected output, either directly or indirectly: 
 
(6)  Et’<t (￿Qt/￿Sit) < 0 
 
(7) Et’<t  (￿Kt/￿Sit) < 0;  
Et’<t (￿Lt/￿Sit) < 0; or  
Et’<t (￿Ht/￿Sit) < 0,   
  i  =  1  …  j. 
 
For example, in communities where social norms restrict 
social contacts across different ethnic groups, this element 
of the social structure will lower outcomes that depend on 
                                                             
8 Note that in this case they would still conform to the 
definition of Schiff (1992) as a form of social capital: as in 
the case of physical capital inputs or human capital inputs, 
some elements here can have a negative effect on 
production. 
the cooperation of the entire fishing fleet.  In such cases, 
while investments in this form of social capital are ruled out 
by definition, the presence of this form of social capital may 
(as further discussed below) call into question the 
implementation of support for local fisheries. 
 
To summarize this section, the definition of Schiff (1992) 
conforms to a functional view of social capital (Coleman 
1990) whereby elements of the social structure can affect 
outcomes in fishing communities through three main 
mechanisms: information sharing; the impact on transaction 
costs, and the reduction of collective action dilemmas.  The 
expected functional relationship between elements of the 
social structure and the proposed deliverable--as 
summarized in (1)-(7)--can serve as a guide to potential 
investments in various forms of social capital. 
 
4.  FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND POTENTIAL 
INVESTMENTS IN SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
With this perspective at hand--that elements of a local social 
structure can be viewed as potential inputs into a fishing 
harvest--one can then begin to evaluate the expected stream 
of benefits and costs associated with various forms of 
capital. 
 
Consider first the benefits.  Building on the notation 
established in the previous section, let the expected benefits 
(at time t￿￿W o) of a potential investment which may be 
undertaken from time to to tn be {U(to), U(t1) …. U(tn)}, so 
that the expected present value of the benefits at time to is: 
 
(8)  Et’<t0  PVBt0   ￿>8￿ti)/(1+r)
i],  
  i  = 0 … n 
 
In addition, let the expected benefits of the potential project 
be increasing and concave in production of the deliverable 
in each year
9, so that: 
(9)  Et’< t0   ￿U(t)/ ￿Qt > 0,   
Et’< t0  ￿
2U(t)/ ￿Qt
2 < 0.  
 
By combining material in (1)--(8), one can formally note 
that: 
 
(9a)  Et’< t0  ￿39%t0 / ￿6it > 0, 
 
                                                             
9 As noted in (1), Xt is an argument in the flow of net social 
benefits.  This implies that social capital -- and other forms 
of capital -- affects the net present value associated with the 
existence of a local fishery.  Tracing this dynamic effect 
requires the derivation of the full solution to a dynamic 
programming problem with a set of constraints, including 
the change of social capital though time. See Sethi and 
Somanathan (1996) for a related approach. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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when (2) holds or when (3) and (4) hold; and that:  
 
(9b) E t’< t0  ￿39%t0 / ￿6it < 0, 
 
when (5) or (6) hold.  In other words, social capital will 
have at positive (negative) effect on the expected net 
present value of a local fishery only when at least one 
element of the local social structure has a positive 
(negative) effect on the production of the deliverable at 
some time in future.
10 
 
Why are (9a - 9b) useful for local stakeholders as they 
assess the policy options for sustainable use of local 
fisheries?  These equations formalize the potential 
relationship between elements of the local structure, other 
potentially productive inputs, and the net social benefits.   
Addressing the implications of these equations suggests that 
one can productively use such a framework to address a 
range of policy options in fisheries management.   
Specifically, as argued below, these equations imply that 
local stakeholders need to take the potential effects of social 
capital into account--even as they imply that such 
practitioners should not always be advocating investments 
in social capital. 
  
First, using this kind of cost-benefit framework shows that 
potential investments in social capital should be considered 
only alongside potential investments in physical and human 
capital.  While (9a) summarizes the possibility that social 
capital will be expected to have at positive effect on the net 
present value of benefits in some local fisheries, the relative 
magnitude of this positive effect should be compared to the 
corresponding (expected) effects of physical and human 
capital. 
   
This leads to the conclusion that only in a limited number of 
cases will investments in social capital--primarily through 
support for local organizations or the regular convening of 
local stakeholders--be called for.  These cases are when: the 
discounted stream of expected benefits of incremental social 
capital is significantly greater than the corresponding 
discounted stream of expected costs; and when the 
uncertainty about potential damages to the local social 
structure through such financial contributions is minimal.   
This latter case is particularly important because, in many 
fishing communities, outside intervention has the potential 
to significantly harm the local social  structure. 
 
Second, since social capital may be a substitute or a 
complement to other inputs which affect project 
                                                             
10 It is of course possible that some elements of the local 
social structure have a positive effect on the production of 
the deliverable while others have a negative effect, thereby 
making the sign of ￿39%t0 / ￿6t unknown. 
performance (as illustrated by (9a), when (3) and (4) hold), 
the potential effect of social capital on the net present value 
of benefits should be assessed in the context of management 
of most local fisheries--even when the potential for 
investments in social capital is unlikely.  The sunk costs of 
this kind of informal or formal ‘social assessment’ of the 
social structure of many communities will, in most cases, be 
relatively small.
11 
 
Specifically, social assessments may also help to identify 
how social characteristics of communities impede the flow 
of information among different sets of households; affect 
transactions costs; or reduce collective action dilemmas.   
For example, in fishing communities with norms that 
discourage social contacts between fishers which use 
different gear types, these norms lower the probability of 
collaborative and sustainable use of the local fishery.   
Overall, this can provide information on which fishing 
communities will, ceteris paribus, have higher expected 
returns to specific management interventions. 
 
Third, by using social assessments and by considering the 
costs and benefits of potential investments in social capital, 
outside experts in fisheries management may advocate, in 
selected cases, no activity be undertaken in low social 
capital communities. Using the cost-benefit framework 
presented above, this would be in the case of (9b) and when 
(5) or (6) hold, and when the expected net benefit of a 
proposed intervention in a specific region is below some 
standard criteria.   
 
Less formally, this would be true when the costs of investing 
in physical capital, labor, or human capital in a certain 
region do not generate enough benefits--precisely because 
levels of social capital in that region are low.   
 
Accordingly, this kind of framework suggests that primary 
investments should not be undertaken in some communities 
because low social capital dramatically reduces the 
likelihood of success; and--relative to high social capital 
communities--the potential benefits of these investments do 
not outweigh the likely costs.  Unless considerations of 
existence value dictate that certain investments should be 
targeted to the most threatened fishing communities 
(including those that have very low levels of social capital), 
this may be the right policy prescription in the likely case 
that public resources are limited. 
   
If considerations of existence value do dictate that certain 
projects should be targeted to most threatened fishing 
communities, then the allocation of investment resources for 
                                                             
11 In the context of international development, social 
assessments are systematic investigations of the social 
processes and factors that affect development impact and 
results. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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such projects may need to must be adjusted to take into 
account the local social structure. Consider, for example, 
investments in the threatened fishing communities of Nova 
Scotia.  If regional or national policy dictates that 
investments should be targeted to the most threatened 
communities, the allocation of investment resources may 
need to be adjusted to take into account the characteristics 
of local social structures.  Possible adjustments include 
investments in the strengthening of local organizations and 
in more frequent opportunities for co-management--in the 
form of stakeholder conferences--among the range of local 
stakeholders.
12 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical perspective that is presented in this paper 
implies that investments in social capital can further 
increase the probability of sustainable use of many (but not 
all) local fisheries.  First, potential investments in social 
capital should be considered only alongside potential 
investments in physical and human capital.  Using a cost-
benefit framework leads to the conclusion that only in a 
limited number of cases will investments in social capital-- 
primarily through support for local organizations or the 
regular convening of local stakeholders--be called for.   
Second, even where investments in social capital may not 
be called for, the potential effect of social capital on well-
being in fishing communities should be assessed in the 
planning of potential investments--since social capital may 
be a substitute or a complement to other inputs which affect 
well-being.  Third, by using social assessments and by 
considering the costs and benefits of potential investments 
in social capital, outside experts in fisheries management 
may advocate, in selected cases, that no activity be 
undertaken in low  social capital communities.  Unless 
considerations of existence value dictate that certain 
investments be targeted to the most vulnerable communities 
(including those that have very low levels of social capital), 
this may be the right policy prescription.   
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12 For a good current example of how investments in social 
capital can potentially increase well-being in fishing 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1: The Characteristics of Economic Goods and the Likelihood of Influence of Social Capital 
Type of good Example of 
good
Information 
sharing
Transactions 
costs
Collective 
action 
Private goods Rival Exclusive Improved 
fertilizer
High Low Low
Toll goods Non-rival Exclusive Irrigation 
system
Low High High
Collective goods Non-rival Non-exclusive Feeder road Low HighH i gh
Common pool 
resource
Rival Non-exclusive Community 
fishery
Low High Very high
Notes:  the potential influence of social capital on the delivery of economic goods
See text for descriptions of the mechanisms and their relationship to the characteristics of economic goods
Characteristics of 
economic good
Potential influence of social capital 
mechanism
 
 